Abstract This paper tests empirically to what extent the rent in a limited
Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to test empirically how the resource rent in a limited access fishery becomes capitalized in the value of a tradeable license. This is done by comparing the profitability of Norwegian purse seine vessels which received their licenses for free, to the profitability of vessels for which licenses were purchased along with the vessel at a market determined price. The hypothesis is that the acquisition value, i.e., the purchase value, of the latter type of vessel includes the value of the purchased license, implying that the profitability of such a vessel will be lower than the profitability of an equally efficient vessel which obtained its license for free. In the case of Norwegian purse seiners the transfer of licensed vessels must be approved by the Ministry of Fisheries, and the specific value of the license itself is not apparent in the market. This implies that indirect methods must be used to reveal the true value of a license, as opposed to the value of the combined vessel and license.
Since the seminal article by Gordon (1954) , fisheries economists have been concerned with the possibility of improvement of the economic efficiency of the fishing industry. Pigouvian taxes, limited entry licensing and individual quota allocations are among the most common management instruments advocated in the literature. The focus is usually on efficiency gains from rent capture in managed fisheries compared to the dissipation of rent in open access fisheries. Analyses on the efficiency and distributional effects of different methods of rent capture, i.e., quota rental tax, profit tax, ad valorum tax, and lump sum tax, are found in Grafton (1992 and 1995) . The latter also includes empirical simulation effects on vessel profits using data from the Canadian sablefish fishery.
A common socioeconomic and political aim of fisheries rationalization from the government point of view has often been to improve the income and profitability of the fishing industry in certain areas. For the general case Tullock (1975) demonstrated that where a government gives long-term assistance to an industrial sector in which it wishes to improve income levels, the gains to the favoured people tend to be transitional. This is the transitional gains trap.
The fact that transferability of free licenses and quotas may lead to a gain for the present generation of fishers at the expense of later generations that have to buy these rights has been noted in the fisheries economic literature, e.g. Copes (1979 Copes ( , 1981 Copes ( and 1986 , Flaaten (1982 and 1987) . However, we are not aware of other empirical studies of the capitalization of fishing rent in the value of fishing licenses where vessels and licenses are sold jointly.
Norwegian Purse Seine Industry
Up until 1969 there was free entry into the Norwegian purse seine fishery. The Arcto-Scandian herring stock, the biggest fish stock in Europe, collapsed in 1968-69. A moratorium on registration of purse seiners in Norway was introduced in 1969 and in January 1973 a new licensing system for purse seiners was introduced for vessels of 90 feet and above (Ørebech 1982) . Later, an additional requirement of cargo capacity of 1,500 hl and above was imposed. All vessels registered in 1973 received their license free of charge, and new applicants were evaluated by a special licensing board. The main aim of the licensing system was to ensure a profitable harvesting industry by rebuilding, or avoiding biological overexploitation of the pelagic stocks of herring, mackerel, blue whiting and capelin. The aim was also to maintain a reasonable regional distribution of the fleet.
The regulatory measure was the cargo capacity of the vessel. In 1973 the total cargo capacity of the licensed vessels was 1.33 million hectolitres (hl). The total license capacity increased by 8% up to 1979, when it reached 1.44 million hl. In the period from 1979 to 1985 the license volume was reduced by approximately 30%, to 1.04 million hl. The reduction in the licensed volume was mainly a result of a government buy-back program and export subsidies for vessels. The license volume per vessel increased from 4,150 hl in 1973 to 6,950 hl in 1985. 1 Although there exists some discrepancy between actual and licensed cargo capacity, the measures are strongly (r = 0.914) correlated in 1983 and 1984. Originally when the licenses were allotted in 1973, they were based on actual capacity. Due to changes in vessel size and that some owners have purchased larger vessel, over time there has become some difference between actual and licensed capacity. The licensed cargo capacity is utilized as the vessel size variable in the econometric analysis.
Formally, the license itself was not transferable because the sale of licensed vessels had to be approved by the Ministry of Fisheries. To maintain a regional balance of the fleet, the intention was to keep the license in the region where it had originally been allocated. However, a system of exceptions soon developed. Applications to transfer licenses were managed in such a way that local bidders were only preferred on the same economic terms. If an outside bidder was willing to pay more, the vessel was consequently sold out of the region. Basically, the "highest bidder" principle was established for transferring the vessel with its license. In fact, the licenses were made transferable (Hersoug 1986) .
Since the aim of the licensing system was to secure a profitable industry, the agents in the fishery probably anticipated a policy in the direction of rationalization. The Ministry of Fisheries did not withstand the pressure to expand the licensing volume and several vessels were rebuilt and had their licensed cargo capacity increased up to 1979. At that time the buy-back program was introduced, leading to a reduction in the total fleet capacity and possibly generating rent. The licensed vessels participated in different seasons.The main seasons for 1983, the first year for which empirical data are presented in this paper, are shown in figure 1. With the exception of the winter capelin season, all of the vessels did not participate in every season. The blue whiting season, for example, requires an additional trawl license; but such licenses were not a scarce good in 1983 and 1984. The seasons shown in figure 1 are managed in different ways, from free fish- 
Method and Econometric Models

General Approach
The profitability of two groups of vessels is being compared. We distinguish between A-vessels, whose owners received their licenses grAtis, and B-vessels, whose owners had to Buy their licenses. The profitability model must meet two requirements. First, it must allow for the calculation of the profitability for the two groups of vessels based on the capital embodied in the vessel. Secondly, total costs must include compensation to all factors of production, including interest on total assets. The profit obtained after the total assets have received a compensation equal to its opportunity cost, is called rent. This is what is left to the owners that received the licenses for free. For companies that bought licenses, we would expect the rent to be approximately zero, at least on average in the long run because the interest on the purchased license value dissipates the potential rent. The resource rent, fully or partly, has been transferred to the first generation of licensees that received licenses gratis.
The basic elements of the profitability model are:
Income from fishing -Share to crew = Gross revenue to vessel -Operating costs (fixed and variable) = Gross profit -Depreciation = Profit -Calculated interest on total assets = Rent
In addition to resource rent, rent here may also include intramarginal rent (or producers' surplus). 2 Because of the share system used for remuneration of the crew, some rent may be hidden.
The main operating costs are fuel, insurance and maintenance of gear and vessel. The problems in the profitability calculation are mainly related to calculating the user cost of capital under changing price levels. The user cost of capital consists of interest and depreciation on total assets, which comprises the value of vessel and equipment. In Heen (1986) two methods which may be used for this purpose are discussed. One method is to depreciate the vessel on the basis of acquisition value and apply a nominal rate of interest. The second method is to use the real rate of interest and depreciate the vessel using current market values.
For the purposes of the present study, the method using current market values is not suitable. As the aim of this study is to calculate the profit for two groups of vessels, those that received their license for free, and those that paid for their license, we cannot use the current market value of a vessel as this would include the license value for both vessel groups. Using the first method, based on aquisition value and nominal rate of interest, makes it possible to calculate the rent based on the actual outlay of the two categories of owners (see appendix for a more detailed presentation of the calculation of the user cost of capital).
In a period of changing price levels, the user cost of capital must ensure that the owner is able to replace the depreciated vessel with a similar new one at the end of the vessel's lifespan. Using the first method, the owner receives compensation for increasing price levels through the nominal interest rate. The second method compensates the owner for increasing price levels using current market values for depreciation. In the case of constant price levels, the two methods will produce the same rent since the book value which is the acquisition value less the accumulated depreciation, equals the current market price for a vessel of a given age, and the nominal rate of interest equals the real rate of interest.
In this study, a linear depreciation plan is applied. The theoretically correct method of depreciation depends on the cash flow of the investment. Estimates of the correct depreciation plan for Norwegian fishing vessels have been made by using crosssection data, and the conclusion is that the hypothesis of a linear depreciation procedure can not be rejected (Gjesdal and Aandal 1994) . This paper includes data for 1983 and 1984, and for these years a linear depreciation plan was used by the industry itself and in cost and revenue studies made by the Directorate of Fisheries in Norway. In addition to calculating the profit and rent, which are given as absolute figures, the profit and rent will also be calculated relative to an economic variable. Such ratios take into account the economic differences between the two categories of vessels. The numerator of such a ratio includes a profit concept and the denominator can measure either the economic flow or stock. Using economic flow in the denominator, the gross profit margin is defined as Gross profit margin = Gross profit 100
Gross revenue to vessel
where the gross profit is the gross revenue minus operating costs, but before depreciation and interest. The gross profit margin expresses what is left as compensation to the capital as a percentage of sales, i.e., the gross revenue to vessel. Using economic stock in the denominator, the return on investment (capital or total assets) is defined as:
Value of the vessel
Profit in expression (2) is defined before interest but after depreciation, and this re-lationship expresses the return on the investment as a percentage of the value of the vessel, including equipment. If we, instead of profit, use rent in the numerator, the ratio is called the net return on investment:
Net return on investment = Rent
This relationship expresses what is left to the company in relation to the value of the vessel after all factors of production, including the capital, have received their compensation.
Econometric Specifications. To summarize our hypotheses we present the equations to be estimated. Equations (4) and (5) represent equations to test for differences in annual gross revenue to vessel, R (in 1,000 NOK) and annual operating costs, C (in 1,000 NOK) for the two vessel types
where the two years have been pooled, but with a dummy to test whether there exist differences over years, D year . A dummy for vessel type is included in both equations to check the hypothesis, in this case for no difference between A and B vessels in gross revenue and variable costs, D Vessel (= 1 for B-vessels). Since we want to control for other relevant variables which may explain performance differences, also the age of vessels (T) and the size of vessels, as measured by licensed cargo capacity (K), are controlled for. A second order linear approximation is utilized when estimating the equations. Different econometric techniques which were used to estimate the functions will be briefly presented in the results section. Equations (6) and (7) represent equations for testing whether depreciation, D (in 1,000 NOK) and annual interests, I (in 1,000 NOK) differ between vessel types.
The hypothesis in this case is that there are differences between A and B vessels in that it is expected that the annual depreciation and interest for a vessel in group B are higher than for an equivalent vessel in group A. The reason is that B vessels have the license value included in the aquisition value which forms the basis for calculating the user cost of capital. Also other characteristics of vessels such as age (T) and capacity (K) are included in order to control for other factors causing heterogeneity among vessels. The same functional forms and estimation procedure were used for equations (6) and (7) as for (4) and (5). One last point worth mentioning before proceeding to present the data set and results in more detail is that one could view the present analysis of the factors affecting different aspects of fishing vessels performance within the framework of socalled hedonic analysis. This implies that we could interpret the two vessel characteristics included in the functions as implicit marginal valuations of the different characteristics for performance for the vessels (see for instance Kirkley and Squires 1988 for this type of analysis). However, we will not provide a broad analysis of this here. We will only briefly discuss the sign and impact of the various characteristics in the presentation of the results.
Data
Data for the purse seiner fleet were collected from a number of sources. The main source was a questionnaire submitted to the owners of all 150 purse seiners in 1985. Some of the data reports were incomplete and for some vessels data for one of the years, 1983 or 1984, were lacking. Excluding those vessels from the present study leaves complete revenue and cost data for both 1983 and 1984 for altogether fortyeight vessels, a response rate of 32%. In addition to depreciation and interest on the initial purchase price of the vessel, user cost of capital must also include depreciation and interest on the additional investments made in the vessel after the initial purchase. Additional investments may include new engine, propeller, electronic equipment, gear handling equipment etc. Data on these investments have been collected for the time period 1975-84. These investments increase the vessel value and have to be depreciated, and also interests must be calculated and included in the user cost of capital (see Heen 1986 for a more comprehensive presentation of the empirical material).
We distinguish between A-vessels whose owners received their licenses grAtis, and B-vessels, whose owners had to Buy their licenses. In order to divide the fortyeight vessels into group A and B, the license files of the Ministry of Fishery and the Directorate of Fisheries were studied. A-vessels are mainly those where the owners had been in the licensed purse seine fisheries since the introduction of the system in 1973, up to 1984. If such an owner in the period 1973-83 had transferred his license to another vessel owned by himself, this was still classified as an A-vessel. This was the case when wrecked or old vessels were replaced. B-vessels are mainly those where the owners were former non-licensees that purchased a licensed vessel with the Ministry of Fishery's formal approval. In a few cases, licensed vessels were purchased and scrapped, and the buyers were allowed to transfer the licensed cargo capacity to another vessel(s). In other cases vessel owners were allotted additional licensed cargo capacity for free from the Ministry, for example when old vessels were rebuilt. The criterion for a B-vessel was that 50% or more of its licensed cargo capacity in 1983 had been bought, and correspondingly that an A-vessel had bought less than 50% of its licensed capacity.
For most vessels it is clear whether they belong to group A or B, because the entire license capacity was either received free of charge from the government or bought. Of the original total sample of forty-eight vessels, five were excluded because the origin of the license capacity could not be clearly traced. This leaves us with forty-three vessels. Only four vessels in group A are assigned to the category in which some of the license (between a fifth and a half) capacity was bought and some received free. For most vessels there is hardly any doubt whether they should belong to group A or B.
In table 2 a summary is provided of the per vessel values of revenue, costs and rent by year and other variables used. As the crew receives a given share of the total catch value, we will for reasons of simplicity only report the companies' revenues from the vessels. Table 2 shows that the average age of A and B-vessels is practically the same, whereas they differ with respect to size measured by licensed cargo capacity. Table 2 also shows that the vessels with free licenses, A-vessels, have a positive rent of 430 and 659 thousand NOK in 1983 and 1984, respectively. The vessel owners which bought their licenses, B-vessels, have a negative rent of -512 thousand and -87 thousand NOK in 1983 and in 1984, respectively. The differences between the two categories of vessels are 942 and 745, respectively, in the two years of analysis. It is the difference of profitability that is of interest in the analysis.
If the main hypothesis of this paper is correct, i.e., the license value is included in the aquisition value of B-vessels, the calculated depreciation in table 2 includes depreciation of the license value for these vessels. In this case, the calculated interests for B-vessels in table 2 comprise interests on the calculated book value of vessels and licenses.
Results
The estimated parameters for equations (4)-(7) are reported in tables 3, 4, 6, and 7, respectively. All equations are estimated using ordinary least squares and by the panel data technique of random effects (see e.g. Greene 1993). The reason for using a panel data procedure is to exploit the panel data features of our balanced, two-year panel of vessels. The fixed effects technique, which is also common when estimat- ing panel data, is not suitable for our analysis. With only two time periods available, it would be very costly with respect to degrees of freedom. However, more severe is the multicollinearity problem which arises when the explanatory variables include dummy variables (see Greene 1993, p. 475 ). In our model the dummy for vessel type will be perfectly correlated with the fixed effect dummy. The random effects technique is a feasible generalized least squares procedure which should be iterated until parameter estimates converge. The number of iterations was determined by the convergence criteria that R-square did not change in the first four decimals. The Lagrange Multiplier (L-M) test reported for the random effects model is a test of how appropriate the random effects model is. The test is described in (Greene 1993, page 476). The null hypothesis to be tested is that the residuals for each vessel from the two time periods are not correlated, in which case the random effects model should not be used. The test statistic is distributed as Chi-squared with one degree of freedom, and the critical values are 3.842 and 6.635 at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively (Greene 1993). We see that this test is in favor of the random effects model.
However, a common problem with the model is that the proposed estimator for the residual variance, which is used in calculating the transformation parameter, does not guarantee a positive variance. In our case this problem occurred for all equations except for the first round of estimation, and although other estimators for the variance have been suggested, the finding seriously questions the model.
A second potential problem concerning the validity of the statistical model is to what degree heteroskedasticity is present. The most obvious reason for heteroskedasticity is that some of the explanatory variables give rise to heteroskedastic residuals; but also other exogenous variables not included in the model could be the cause. White's heteroskedastic consistent t-values are reported, and the values indicate that some degree of heteroskedasticity is present, though it is probably not very strong.
It seems likely that any problem with heteroskedasticity in our four estimations will have different causes. For equations (4) and (5) high capacity will not only be associated with high income and costs but also with larger variance in these variables. For equations (6) and (7) on the other hand, low age and B-vessels are correlated with high depreciation and interest payments, and also with higher variance in these variables.
A number of formal tests were performed, including the Goldfeld-Quandt test, both with data sorted by age of vessels (T) and by capacity (K), Harvey's test for multiplicative heteroskedasticity and the White's test for heteroskedasticity including both variables to the first-and second-order. The different specifications of heteroskedasticity indicate that heteroskedasticity is present for the different models. However, the specific structure of heteroskedasticity is not possible to detect. Hence, White's procedure for correcting for heteroskedasticity is reported.
Revenue and Operating Costs
In table 3 the results for the gross vessel revenue are presented. A priori we do not expect that there should be any difference between the two vessel groups concerning the revenue. However, for the random effects model the gross vessel revenue is significantly lower for B-vessels than for A-vessels, however, only at the 10% level.
Factors not included explicitly in model specification are possible candidates to explain this results. We will come back to further interpretations of these results under table 4 when the results from the operating costs are presented. Table 4 shows that the dummy coefficients in all cases are slightly negative; but in none of the cases are they significantly different from zero. From the results presented in tables 3 and 4 the null hypothesis that A-and B-vessels are equal with respect to revenue and operating costs is partially rejected. Table 3 shows that the annual gross revenue of A-vessels is significantly higher than that of B-vessels, whereas table 4 shows that the annual operating costs of A and B vessels are not significantly different. However, different operating time, different fishing opportunities regionally and inside/outside the purse seine fisheries and different skills of skippers and crew members, could be possible explanations. To investigate these explanations more data have to be collected. 
Gross Profit Margin
In addition to using technical variables such as age of vessel and licensed cargo capacity as explanatory variables, let us use the purely economic indicator in expression (1) to study the operational performance of A-and B-vessels. Using (1) to perform a one-way analysis of variance to compare the means of gross profit margins between the A-and B-vessels gives the results shown in table 5. The results in table 5 demonstrate that for 1983 the mean gross profit margin of A-vessels is slightly above that of B-vessels, but the difference is far from being statistically significant. For 1984 the mean gross profit margin is practically the same for A-and B-vessels.
From the results in tables 3, 4, and 5 we conclude that from an operating performance point of view there is some difference between the A-vessels, whose owners got their licenses for free, and the B-vessels, whose owners had to pay for their licenses by buying licensed vessels. However, the difference in gross profit margin between the two groups is not significant, and this is in accordance with the theory and hypothesis outlined in the methods and econometric models section. 
Depreciation and Interest
According to our methods and econometric models, it is expected that the annual depreciation and interest for a vessel in group B is higher than that of an equivalent vessel in group A. The reason for this is that B-vessels have the license value included in the acquisition value that is the basis for the calculation of the capital costs. We now proceed to test the hypothesis that capital costs are higher for B-vessels than for A-vessels. The estimated parameters for equations (6) and (7) are shown in tables 6 and 7, respectively. Tables 6 and 7 show that depreciation and interests are significantly higher for B-vessels than for A-vessels. This supports the hypothesis that the user cost of capital is higher for the B-vessels whose owners bought their licenses than for A-vessels whose owners received their licenses free of charge.
Net Return on Investment
Having tested depreciation and interest of A and B vessels against each other, using age and licensed cargo capacity to adjust for technical differences, we now proceed to compare the net return on investment from expression (3).
The problem with formula (3) is that some elements of both the numerator and the denominator have to be calculated, and that this can be done in different ways. Rent was calculated by using gross vessel revenue, operating costs, depreciation and interests as they are defined above. For the vessel values we use two different definitions. The first is the calculated book value based on acquisition value and 30-year linear depreciation (see appendix for details). The second is the market value of the vessel, including the value of the license. Estimates of market values have been given by the Vessel Owners Association for each of the vessels included in this study. These net return rates are denoted Pr1 and Pr2 for the calculated book value and the market value cases respectively. We use analysis of variance on these profit rates of A and B-vessels to test the hypothesis that net return on investment is equal (PrA = PrB) against the alternative that net return on investment is different for the two vessel groups (PrA ≠ PrB).
The problem with vessel values based on calculated book value is that three of the vessels had zero value and therefore had to be excluded from the computation of Pr1-1 shown in line 1 in table 8. There are also some vessels with very low values which give them up to 4,000% profit. Excluding all vessels with return rates above 100% for Pr1 gives the results presented for Pr1-2 in table 8.
As explained above we should not expect too much of the results in the Pr1-1 case. When the most extreme vessels, i.e. those with Pr1 > 100%, are excluded we are left with nine B-vessels, and 21 and 22 A-vessels for 1983 and 1984, respectively. The results of case Pr1-2 in table 8 show that there is a significant difference between the remaining A and B-vessels, with highest profit for the A-vessels. The results of the Pr2-cases, based on the market values of the vessels, also demonstrate a significant difference in the net return on investment for A and B vessels, as shown in the lower part of table 8. To sum up, we have not been able to reject he main hypothesis in the paper, i.e., A-vessels have significantly higher net return on investment than B-vessels.
Conclusion
This study has investigated the invisible resource rent in a combined license and quota managed fishery: the Norwegian purse seine fisheries. In a sample of fortythree vessels, twelve owners had bought their licenses by purchasing a licensed vessel, whereas thirty-one had got their licenses for free when the licensing system was introduced in 1973 . For 1983 and 1984 there is a significant difference in the profitability performance of the two vessel groups. The main reason for this is that those vessels that had bought their licenses had higher capital costs and therefore lower profitability than the others. Since license prices in this case have been included in the aquisition value of the vessels, conventional accounting surveys based on acquisition value do not distinguish between the capital costs of the vessel itself and the capital costs of the license.
Profitability analyses of limited entry fisheries often do not distinguish between real capital (vessel and equipment) and financial capital embodied in the license value. For the single company's economic performance, it is not necessarily of importance to distinguish between the capital costs of the license and other capital costs. However, when it comes to the question of the social costs of the fishing industry, it is of importance to make such a distinction. The licence costs represent the discounted value of expected future rent, including the resource rent, for the firms and are not social costs.
In bioeconomic studies social costs should be used to derive the optimal fishing strategy with respect to e.g. effort, harvest rate and resource stock level. The first policy implication of the findings in this paper is that using cost figures from accounting surveys of vessels in a limited entry fishery may exaggerate the social cost of fishing, unless one adjusts for the license value.
The second policy implication is that transferability of licenses and quotas, as time goes, will gradually reduce the initial industry profitability of a governmental buy-back or scrapping program. Transferable licenses and quotas given for free to the fishermen may be efficient in reducing the capacity of the fishing fleet, but they are probably not able to secure future above-normal remuneration for the industry. Transferability of licenses and quotas means transfer of rent to the first generation of licensees at the expense of later generations that have to buy their fishing rights. In a combined limited entry and quota management system, as seen in the case of the Norwegian purse seine fleet, transferability implies gradual invisibilisation of the resource rent. Thus, the transitional gains trap is working also in this limited entry and quota managed fishery. the accumulated depreciation. The rate of interest reflects the opportunity costs of the capital. For 1983 and 1984 the rate of interest was 12.5% which was the rate of return on government bonds in Norway for those years. The acquisition cost consists of three components: acquisition cost of the vessel, improvements in the vessel, and new equipment. In the present study all improvements and acquisition of equipment made after 1974 has been surveyed. In the profitability analysis, the depreciation and interest on these two groups of assets are underestimated because acquisition of such assets made before 1975 is not included. This applies only to improvements in the vessel. Investment in new equipment is depreciated over 10 years and acquisition of such assets in 1974 or earlier is fully depreciated by 1984.
